Robert Heidlebaugh and Gretta Joyce Heidlebaugh, husband and wife v. Leroy Webb, Paul Nelson, and Clinton City : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Robert Heidlebaugh and Gretta Joyce
Heidlebaugh, husband and wife v. Leroy Webb, Paul
Nelson, and Clinton City : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Peter C. Collins; Tamara K. Prince; Winder and Haslam; Attorneys for Appellants.
Robert G. Gilchrist; Masuda a. Medcalf; Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson; Attorneys for
Respondents.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Heidlebaugh v. Webb, No. 890071 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1575
U1AH 
DOCU 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. mi-c& 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and 
GRETTA JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
-v-
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON, 
and CLINTON CITY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 890071-CA 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Masuda A. Medcalf 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Peter C. Collins 
Tamara K. Prince 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Suite 4000 
175 West 200 South 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Respondents Attorneys for Appellants 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and 
GRETTA JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
-v-
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON, 
and CLINTON CITY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 890071-CA 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Masuda A. Medcalf 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
5 0 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Peter C. Collins 
Tamara K. Prince 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Suite 4000 
175 West 200 South 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Respondents Attorneys for Appellants 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and 
GRETTA JOYCE HEIDLEBAUGH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
-v-
LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON, 
and CLINTON CITY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 890071-CA 
APPELLANTS1 REPLY BRIEF 
Respondents have failed to counter the most salient fact 
of this Appeal and the most essential point of appellants1 
argument. That fact and that point are that the dismissal of 
the first action came about by reason of a stipulation between 
the parties. None of the cases cited by respondents in support 
of their contention that the dismissal was pursuant to Rule 
4Kb) rather than 41(a), was "with prejudice," and was "on the 
merits" includes that simple but most important element of the 
procedural history. As pointed out in Appellants1 Brief (at 
page 12), the court in the first action was never even asked 
to rule on anything in dispute. The question of what the 
court in the first action would have done in the absence of a 
stipulation for dismissal, and in the event that the proceed-
ings scheduled for December 1986 on defendants' motion to 
compel had gone forward, is one that can only be answered by 
speculation. The court may well have entered sanctions, such 
as the imposition of costs and attorney's fees, but it is not 
likely, or at least not close to certain, that the court, 
which had entered no prior discovery order, would have imposed 
so harsh a sanction as dismissal of the action. 
Mr. and Mrs. Heidlebaugh do not contest the correctness 
of the proposition, hammered hard in Respondents' Brief, that 
a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether an 
action should be dismissed because of a plaintiff party's non-
appearance for a scheduled deposition. The main point of this 
Appeal, however, is that there was no discretion for the court 
to exercise in the first action. The cases cited by respon-
dents, in which the very dismissals were contested matters, 
and in which it was incumbent on the trial courts to exercise 
some discretion, are of only academic interest. They have no 
bearing on this Appeal. For, in the first action, there was 
no need for the judge to exercise any discretion whatsoever or 
to make any decision whatsoever. The judicial decision-making 
function was simply not triggered in that action, just as it 
is not triggered in most, if not all, civil disputes, when a 
stipulation of counsel is presented to a trial judge. 
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Respondents1 contention that "Judge Cornaby properly 
dismissed the Heidlebaughsf first action for their repeated 
failure to make themselves available for depositions" (Respon-
dents1 Brief, p. 17) is, simply, inaccurate. The deposition 
of Mrs. Heidlebaugh had never been scheduled, prior to the 
December 1986 stipulation that led to the dismissal. More 
importantly, Judge Cornaby dismissed the first action because 
there was a stipulation by counsel for the parties that the 
action would be dismissed. 
Nor is there support for defendants1 proposition (Respon-
dents1 Brief, p. 19) that "Mr. Caine [the Heidlebaughs1 
counsel in the first action] was compelled to sign the stipu-
lation because of Clinton City's motion to compel." Entering 
the stipulation was a voluntary act, not a compulsory one, and 
the dismissal was a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal. 
Based on (1) the authorities presented in Appellants' 
Brief, (2) the brief reply set forth herein to the contentions 
advanced in Respondents' Brief, (3) the proposition, discussed 
at page 11 of Appellants' Brief, that a dismissal with preju-
dice should not lightly be inferred where, as here, an attorney 
has not been empowered by his clients to stipulate to a dis-
missal with prejudice, and (4) the proposition, discussed at 
pages 13 and 14 of Appellants' Brief, that the benefit of the 
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doubt with respect to the application of the rules should be 
given to determinations of cases on their merits, Mr. and 
Mrs. Heidlebaugh restate their contention that the District 
Court's order of dismissal of the second action should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 2-t& day of April, 1989. 
WINDER/\& HASLAM, P.C. 
£**/*• 
$>&'-' By. 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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